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THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. THOMAS CARTER, 
Appellant. 
[1] Searches and Seizures-Consent-Br Wife.-When the 11811&1 
amicable relations exist between husband and wife and prop-
erty seized during his absence from the home is of a kind 
over which she normally exercises as much control as he, it is 
reasonable to conclude that she is in a position to consent to 
a search and seizure in their home, and if she freely consents 
to a removal of his property there is no unreasonahle Be&l'Ch 
or seizure. 
[2] ld.-Consent-Burden of Proof.-The prosecution has the 
burden of proving consent of defendant's wife to a search and 
seizure of his property during his absence. 
[3] ld.-Waiver of Objections.-Defendant waived any objections 
he may have had to a seizure of a letter written by him 
and given to his wife to mail, when he introduced the letter at 
the trial. 
[4] ld.-Consent-By Wife.-Where evidence supports the trial 
court's conclusion that defendant's wife freely consented to 
police officers' entering their living room to question her about 
defendant's activities, the evidence they gained from their con-
versation and observation is admissible. 
[6] ld.-Consent-Br Wife.-In a prosecution for first degree 
murder, evidence that defendant's wife freely cooperated with 
police officers on a visit to their home, produced defendant's 
trousers when she was requested to do so, and consented to 
the subsequent taking of his shirt, allegedly worn at the time 
of the crime, supported the trial court's conclusion that she 
consented to an officer's taking the trousers when he returned 
for them. 
[6] Criminal Law-Compelling Production of Evidence.-On de-
fendant's motion in a first degree murder case to compel the 
district attorney to turn over to defendant's criminologist all 
[1] Authority to consent for another to search or seizure, note, 
31 A.L.R.2d 1078. See also Cal.Jur., Searches and Seizures, § 2 
et seq.; Am.Jur., Searches and Seizures, §§ 71, 72. 
MeR. Dig. References: [1-5] Searches and Seizures, §1; [6,14] 
Criminal Law, § 271; [7] Criminal Law, § 375; [8] Criminal Law, 
§287; [9] Criminal Law, §416; [10] Criminal Law, §556; [11,12] 
Criminal Law, § 524; [13] Criminal Law, § 416; [l5] Criminal 
Law, § 272; [16-19] C.riminal Law, § 286: [20] Criminal Law, 
§277; [21] Criminal, Law, §291: [22] Homicide, §175; [23] Homi-
cide, § 174: [24] Criminal Law, § 888. 
ca c:.Jd-.4t 
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physieal evidenee taken from the tavern where the deceased 
was found unconscious, all photographs made there, aud the 
findings of the prosecution's criminologist based on his exami-
tion of the premises, no order of court was necessary, where 
the district attorney voluntarily produced all that defendant 
requested. 
[7] Id.-Evidence-Facts Subsequent to Offense-Attempted Sui-
cide.-Where the prosecution in a murder case relied on de-
fendant's attempted suicide upon being summoned to the poliee 
station as evidence of a guilty mind and thus as indireet 
evidence that he had administered the beating to the deceased, 
who was found unconscious in a tavern, it was error to exclude 
testimony by a physician that immediately after defendant 
attempted suicide he was rushed to the hospital in a critical 
condition, that defendant thought he would die and that to 
clear his conscience he stated he had passed some bad checks 
but made no mention of the tavern or the deceased, since such 
testimony provided an explanation for the suicide other than 
that offered by the prosecution; such testimony would be 
cumulative in the sense that it was identical in subject matter 
with testimony defendant gave on the stand and in a state-
ment to the district attorney, but not cumulative in respect 
to its evidentiary weight. 
[8] Id.-Rebuttal Evidence.-In a prosecution for first degree 
murder, it was error to exclude the testimony of defendant's 
minister that defendant told him the same story as he told 
on the stand, namely, that he left the tavern where the crime 
was committed, then returned and found the deceased lying 
on the fioor, and in turning him over got blood on his clothes, 
where at the time he told this story to his minister he did not 
know that the blood on his clothes had been analyzed as the 
deceased's type or that hairs similar to the deceased's had 
been found on his trousers, since defendant had a right to 
introduce this testimony to rebut the prosecution's charge that 
his story was a recent fabrication. 
[9] ld. - Evidence - Experiments. - Generally, the requirement 
making the admission of experimental evidence depend on 
whether the experiment was conducted under circumstances 
substantially similar with those existing at the time and plaee 
of the event in issue is imposed only when ii is claimed that 
the results of the experiment are directly relevant to some 
issue in the case. 
[10] ld.-Evidence-Opinions of Experts-QnaJUications.-In a 
prosecution for first degree murder, evidence that a crimi-
nologist made certain experiments in blood dynamics, namely, 
that he had bea~en various bloody objects with instruments 
of different shapes in order to grasp the relationship between 
blood spots and their causes, was properly admitted to qualify 
) 
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him as an expert in blood dynamics, to show that by training 
and experience he was able from an analysis of the size and 
shape of blood spots to determine their source with some de-
gree of accuracy, and to enable the jury to test the reliability 
of his opinions by revealing their foundation. 
[l1] ld.-Evidence - Documentary Evidence - Photographs.-If 
the principl!l effect of photographs of a murder victim is to 
arouse the passions of the jury and inflame them against de-
fendant because of the horror of the crime, the evidence must 
be excluded, but if the ev,idence has probative value with re-
spect to a fact in issue th'lt outweighs the danger of prejudice 
to defendant, the evidence: is admissible even if it is gruesome 
and may incidentally arouse the passions of the jury; the mat-
ter is primarily for the determination of the trial court in 
the exercise of its discretion. 
[12] ld.-Evidence-Documentary Evidence-Photographs.-!n a 
prosecution for first degree murder, where a crucial question 
was whether the deceased's wounds were caused by a flex-
handle wrench found in a slough near defendant's home and 
certain colored slides of the deceased taken at the time of the 
autopsy graphically showed the nuture of these wounds, the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the slides 
in evidence as a basis for testimony by the autopsy surgeon 
that the wounds could have been caused by the wrench and 
that certain irregularities in the wounds could correspond to 
an irregularity in the wrench, particularly where the court 
carefully warned the jury against allowing the slides to prej-
udice them against defendant. 
[IS] ld.-Evidence-Experiments-Lie Detector Tests.-Lie de-
tector tests do not have enough reliability to justify the ad-
mission of expert testimony based on their results; and a sus-
pect's willingness or unwillingness to take such a test is like-
wise without enough probntive value to justify its admission. 
[14] ld.-Compelling Production of Evidence.-A defendant in a 
criminal case can compel the production of a document when 
it becomes clear during the course of a trial that the prosecu· 
tion has in its possession relevant and material e,idence that 
is not confidential, because the state has no interE'st in denying 
the accused access to all· evidence that can throw light on 
issues in the ease. 
[15] ld-Inspection of Papers.-A defendant has the right to see 
a transcript which the prosecution uses to impeach defendant's 
witness and which defendant seeks to in~pect for the purpose 
of rehrthilitntion: the witness' memory of what he said is not 
enough. 
[11] See Cal.Jur.2tl; Evidpnc(', § 22G et seq.: Am.Jur., Kddence. 
§ 727 et seq. 
740 PEOPLE t1. CARTER [48 C.20 
(16J Id.-Order of Proof-Evidence in Chief on Rebuttal.-The 
purpose of Pen. Code, § 1093, subd. 4, restricting the use of, 
evidence in chief on rebuttal, is to assure an orderly presenta-
tion of evidence so that the trier of fact will not be confused. 
to prevent a party from unduly magnifying certain evidence! 
by dramatically introducing it late in the trial, and to avoid! 
any unfair surprise that may result when a party who thinks \ 
he has met his opponent's case is suddenly confronted at the I 
end of the trial with an additional piece of crucial evidence. I 
[17] Id.-Order of Proof-Evidence in Chief on Rebuttal.-Proper: 
rebuttal evidence does not include a material part of the case i, 
in the prosecution's possession that tends to establish defend- ! 
ant's commission of the crime; it is restricted to evidence made 
necessary by defendant's case in the sense that he has intro-
duced new evidence or made assertions that were not implicit 
in his denial of guilt. 
[18] Id.-Order of Proof-Evidence in Chief on Rebuttal.-A de-
fendant's reiterated denial of guilt and the principal facts 
that purportedly establish it does not justify the prosecution's 
introduction of new evidence to establish that which defendant 
would clearly have denied from the start. 
119] Id.-Order of Proof-Evidence in Chief on Rebuttal.-In a 
prosecution for first degree murder, it was improper to allow 
the prosecution to introduce in evidence on rebuttal a red cap 
similar to one worn by defendant and found in a slough near 
defendant's home, where defendant's plea made it clear that 
he would not admit having gone to the slough, his denial on the 
stand furnished no new matter for rebuttal, and the cap should 
have been presented by the prosecution as part of its case in 
chief. 
:20J Id.-Order of Proof.-Changes in the order of proof called 
for by Pen. Code, § 1093, can be made within the sound dis-
cretion of the trial court. 
:21] ld.-Reopening Case for Further Testimony.-In a prosecu-
tion for first degree murder, the trial court abused its discre-
tion in denying defendant's motion to reopen the case to 
introduce evidence that a red cap, similar to one found in 8 
slough near defendant's home (admitted in evidence) and to 
one owned hy defendant, was found on a street corner on the 
route defendant had taken from the scene of the murder to 
his home, where the prosecution relied heavily on the fact that 
a red cap similar to one worn by defendant had been found 
with a wrench and the deceased's wallet in the slough; and 
the faet that a red cap found in the evidence room of the 
sheriff's office could not be immediately identified as the cap 
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[22] Homicide-Imtructions.-In a prosecution for first degree 
muruer, the court diel not err in failing to in3truct on the 
distinction between robbery and burglary, as against the asser-
tion that the jury knew defendant had been convicted of bur-
glary in another state and might have thought that burglary 
like robbery involved violence against the person of another, 
where the court carefully instructed the jury that it could 
take defenuant's prior conviction into account only in assessing 
his credibility; on the issue of credibility it was irrelevant 
whether or not defendant's prior conviction had been a crime 
of violence. 
[23] Id.-Instructions.-In a prosecution for first degree murder, 
the court did not err in failing to instruct that the homicide 
was not in the perpetration of robbery if the intent to rob 
arose after the attack on the deceased, where at no time during 
trial did defendant eon tend that he thought of robbing the 
deceased only after attacking him, but, on the contrary, denied 
either attacking or robbing him. 
[24] Criminal Law-Instructions-Circumstantial Evidence.-In a 
case which rests entirely on circumstantial evidence, it is error 
to refuse an instruction that each fact which is essential to 
complete a chain of circumstances that will establish defend-
ant's guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239, 
subd. (b» from a judgment of the Superior Court of Butte 
County and from an order denying a new trial. J. F. Good, 
Judge. Reversed. 
Prosecution for murder. JUdgment of first degree murder 
imposing the death penalty, reversed. 
Robert K. Stone, under appointment by the Supreme Court, 
Laughlin & McKalson and Robert E. Laughlin for Appel-
lant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Doris H. Maier and 
J. M. Sanderson, Deputy Attorneys General, and C. Keith 
Lyde, District Attorney (Butte) for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant was convicted of murder in the 
first degree and the jury imposed the death pena1ty. A 
motion for a new trial was denied. This appeal is automatic. 
(Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).) 
On September 29; 1955, about 3 :35 p. m., Frank Carey, 
owner of the Log' Cabin Bar near Chico, was found uncon-
742 PEOPLE v. CARTER [48 C.2d 
acious on the floor of the card room of his bar, his head 
bloody and bruised. He never regained consciousness and 
died several hours later as a result of his injuries. 
Defendant was in the bar from the time Carey opened 
it about 12 :30 p. m. until shortly after 3 p. m., drinking beer, 
playing the pinball machine, and talking with other customers. 
Witnesses testified that he was wearing khaki trousers, a dark 
jacket, and a cap with a pushed-up bill. His grey Dodge 
pickup truck was parked out in front. The last person to see 
him in the bar was a salesman who arrived about 3 p. m. and 
stayed about five minutes. He spoke briefly with Carey and 
defendant. Carey told him that business had been good that 
week and that he was holding a 20-dollar bet on the World 
Series. About 3 :35 p. m., Carey's accountant entered the bar 
and found Carey unconscious. A no-sale sign was rung up on 
the cash register, and there was no currency in the drawer. 
At about 3 :25 p. m. a grey pickup similar to defendant's 
cut in front of a school bus on the highway near defendant's 
house, causing the bus driver to stop suddenly to avoid a 
collision. The pickup entered the driveway of defendant's 
house. At 4 p. m. defendant's landlord went to the house to 
collect the rent, which was a month and a half in arrears. 
Defendant appeared in dark, not khaki trousers. ne promised 
to pay the rent soon. 
Shortly after midnight, Deputy Sheriff Rushton confronted 
defendant and his wife in a cocktail lounge in Chico and 
informed defendant that the sheriff wanted to talk to him 
at the police station. Defendant asked if he could take his 
wife home first, and Rushton agreed. Defendant, his wife, 
anu Rushton then drove to the Carter house in the pickup, 
while another officer followed in a patrol car. As they entered 
the house, defendant handed his wife a notebook, telling her 
to mail the letter therein. While Rushton waited in the living 
room. defendant looked in on his children in their beds. 
He then went into the bathroom and closed the door. There-
after Rushton heard the latch click and called to defendant 
several times but got no response. When he heard something 
fall to the floor, he broke down the bathroom door. He found 
that defendant had slashed his arm with a razor and was 
lying on the floor with blood spurting from an artery. De-
spite defendant's resistance Rushton managed to check the 
flow of blood. He testified that defendant said to him after com-
Ing out of a state of- shock, "You wouldn't tell me what you 
wanted me for, but I knew"; that Rushton asked, "What 
) 
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did you think we wanted you forI" and that defendant did 
not answer but "just laid back and grinned." Other police 
officers arrived, an ambulance was summoned, and defendant 
was removed to a hospital. 
Early in November 1955, Carey's wallet, a llexhandle 
wrench, and a red cap were found under a bridge at Edgar 
Slough, about two-tenths of a mile from defendant's house. 
There was no money in the wallet, although Carey was in the 
habit of carrying substantial sums. One of defendant's 
neighbors, E. E. Myers, testified that he had lent defendant a 
set of tools that included a wrench of the same make and size 
as the one found in Edgar Slough and that this wrench was 
not among the tools shown to him by the police as those re-
moved from defendant's truck. 
Dr. Paul Kirk, a witness for the prosecution, testified that 
he examined the card room of the Log Cabin shortly. after 
the homicide, and found that the grease on the 1l00r was 
identical with grease on the wrench discovered in Edgar 
Slough. He also testified that there was blood on defendant's 
shoes and the lower part of his khaki trousers, and that the 
blood was type B, Carey's type. He further testified that he 
found on the inside of the right rear pocket of the trousers 
another blood stain and two hairs that had a "microscopic 
identity" with hair taken from Carey's head. Finally, he 
testified that one of 11 hairs found in the cap from Edgar 
Slough was "morphologically indistinguishable" from one-
fifth of a sample of defendant's hair. 
Defendant took the stand in his own behalf and denied that 
he had either robbed or beaten Carey. His own account of 
what he did on September 29th was substantially as follows: 
He left the Log Cabin shortly after 3 p. m. intending to go 
home, but after driving a short distance decided to return 
and try his luck again at the pinball machine. When he 
entered the bar and did not see Carey, he called several 
times. Receiving no answer, he looked into the card room. 
There he saw Carey lying on the floor with his face to the 
wall, bleeding and breathing hard. He bent over the body 
and rolled it towards him, und blood spattered on his trousers, 
shoes, and hands. He reached for a handkerchief in his rear 
pocket and must have stained it with blood. 
Defendant testified. that he was terrified by these events and 
by the realization·tbat many persons had seen him in the 
bar and if police questioned him they would find out that he 
had violated his parole from the Washington State Peni-
) 
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tcntiary te wJ}ich he had been sentenced for burglary. He 
therefore did not report his discovery to anyone but drove 
straight home and laterehanged his trousers. In a statement 
to the police on September 30th, however, he had denied any 
knowledge that Carey had been beaten and stated that the 
blood on his trousers must have been his own. 
Defendant explained his attempted suicide by testifying 
that he was short of money and owed a number of bills, that 
he had passed several bnd checks, and that he was afraid 
he would be sent back to prison as a parole violator. More-
over, he was generally despondent and had intended for some 
time to kill himself. The notebook that defendant handed to 
his wife before his attempted suicide contained a letter to 
his uncle, written before the attack on Carey, declaring de-
fendant's intention to kill himself. 
Before trial defendant moved to suppress evidence allegedly 
acquired by a search and seizure in violation of defendant's 
constitutional rights. The motion was denied. During the 
trial defendant unsuccessfully renewed his objection to the 
use of some of this evidence. His objection compels examina-
tion of the circumstances under which the challenged evidence 
was obtained. 
After defendant attempted to kill himself and Deputy 
Rushton broke into the bathroom, about half an hour elapsed 
before defendant was removed in an ambulance. Mrs. Carter 
testified that during that time she was confused by the numer-
ous police coming in and out of the house and that her five 
children were upset and crying over the commotion and the 
sight of their father being carried out on a stretcher. 
About 1 :15 a. m., some 15 minutes after defendant had 
been carried out and all the police had left, Deputy Arbuckle 
returned to the house. He testified that "The sheriff told me 
to go back and get the letter Mr. Carter mentioned." When 
Mrs. Carter answered the door, he told her that "the sheriff 
wanted me to come back and get the letter," or, according to 
Mrs. Carter, "he had to see the letter." She handed over 
the notebook containing the letter, and although she asked if 
she could keep the notebook itself, Arbuckle stated that it 
would be better if he took the letter and the whole notebook. 
While Deputy Arbuckle was still in the house, two more 
officers appeared and questioned Mrs. Carter about the clothes 
defendant had been wearing during the day. They testified 
that they asked Mrs. parter if they could see defendant'8 
trousers, and that sne got them from another room. Kra. 
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Carter testified that it was the officers themselves who got the 
trousers. After examining the trousers, the officers left them 
on the ironing board and departed. 
Around 2 :15 a. m. Deputy Arbuckle returned to the house 
again and told Mrs. Carter, "the Sheriff wanted me to bring 
those trousers up," or, according to Mrs. Carter, "that they 
would have to have the trousers." Mrs. Carter said nothing 
and stepped aside; Arbuckle went in, took the trousers from 
the ironing board, and departed. Arbuckle did not inform 
Mrs. Carter that she could refuse to turn the trousers over 
to him, and she testified that she did not know she could 
refuse. She also testified that the police would not tell her 
why they were investigating her husband. 
Still later, Arbuckle and Rushton returned once again, and, 
according to their testimony, asked Mrs. Carter if they could 
have the shirt, or "informed [Mrs. Carter that they] ... came 
after the shirt ..•. " They testified that this time they told 
her she could refuse. She said that the children were upset 
and she would prefer not to be disturbed again until morning, 
but the officers said that if they could have the shirt they 
would not bother her again. Mrs. Carter said all right, if 
this would be the last time, and Rushton went in and took 
the shirt from the bathroom. 
About 8 a. m. more officers appeared at the house, examined 
defendant's pickup truck, which was parked either in the 
driveway or in front of the house, and made a list of the tools 
in it. They either told Mrs. Carter they were taking the 
truck away or asked and received her permission to take it 
away. It is admitted that at no time during these visits to 
defendant's house did the police have a warrant or was de-
fendant under arrest. 
The prosecution contends that the consent of defendant's 
wife justified the seizure of his property. The effect of a 
wife's consent to the search or seizure of her husband's prop-
erty is the subject of sharp disagreement in other jurisdic-
tions. (See e.g., United States v. Heine (2d Cir.), 149 F.2d 
485, 488, cert. denied, 325 U.S. 885 [65 S.Ot. 1578, 89 L.Ed. 
2000]; United States v. Sergio (E.D.N.Y.), 21 F. Supp. 553, 
554; Ellis v. State, 130 Tex.Crim. 220 [93 S.W.2d 438, 439-
440] ; Cass v. State, 124 Tex.Crim. 208 [61 S.W.2d 500, 501-
503] ; but see e.g., Cofer v. United States (5th Cir.), 37 F.2d 
677,679; Dalton v. State, 230 Ind. 626 [105 N.E.2d 509, 511-
512, 31 A.L.R.2d 1071] ; Simmons v. State, 94 Okla.9rim. 18 
[229 P.2d 615, 618]; Almot., 31 A.L.R.2d 1078, 1080-1081, 
) 
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1091.) The problem ca11s for a determination of whether the 
wife's relation to her husband and his property is such that 
there is no invasion of his privacy if she consents. 
[1] When the husband is absent from the home, it is the 
wife who controls the premises, the ordinary household prop- . 
erty, the family automobile, and with her husband's tacit 
consent determines who sha11 and who shall not enter the 
house on business or pleasure and what property they may 
take away with them. (Cf. People v. Dominguez, 144 Cal. 
App.2d 63, 65 [300 P.2d 194].) When the usual amicable 
relations exist between husband and wife (cf. Kelley v. State, 
184 Tenn. 143 [197 S.W.2d 545, 546]), and the property 
seized is of a kind over which the wife normally exercises 
as much control as the husband, it is reasonable to conclude 
that she is in a position to consent to a search and seizure 
of property in their home. If Mrs. Carter freely consented 
to the removal of defendant's property, there was no unreason-
able search or seizure. (Peop~e v. Burke, 47 Ca1.2d 45, 49 
[301 P.2d 241] ; People v. Gorg, 45 Ca1.2d 776, 782-783 [291 
P.2d 469] ; People v. Martin, 45 Ca1.2d 755, 761 [290 P.2d 
855] ; People v. Michael, 45 Cal.2d 751, 753-754 [290 P.2d 
852] ; People v. Wilson, 145 Cal.App.2d 1, 7 [301 P.2d 974] ; 
see Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 [41· S.Ct. 266, 65 
L.Ed. 654].) [2] The burden of proving such consent was 
on the prosecution. (Badillo v. Superior Court, 46 Ca1.2d 269, 
272 [294 P.2d 23].) 
No question arises as to the seizure of the notebook and 
letter by Deputy Arbuckle on his 1 :15 a. m. visit. [3] The 
evidence in the letter was favorable to defendant, and by intro-
ducing it at the trial himself, he has waived whatever objec-
tions he may have had. [4] As to the second visit by 
Officers Parker and Evans, the evidence supports the con-
clusion that Mrs. Carter freely consented to their entering 
the living room to question her about defendant's activities. 
(See People v. Michael, 45 Ca1.2d 751, 754 [290 P.2d 852].) 
What evidence they gained from their conversation and obser-
vation was therefore admissible. [5] Moreover, the evidence 
that Mrs. Carter freely cooperated with the officers on this 
visit, produced the trousers when she was requested to do so, 
and consented to the subsequent taking of the shirt, supports 
the trial court's conclusion that she also consented to Deputy 
Arbuckle's taking the trousers when he returned for them. 
The state of the record makes it impossible for us to 
determine whether the evidence gained from the search of 
June 1957] PEOPLE tJ. CARTER 
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defendant's truck was properly admitted. At the hearing 
before trial on the motion to suppress, the only evidence intro-
duced on this question was Mrs. Oarter's testimony that an 
officer had come to the door and told her that they were taking 
the truck away, and that she had not said that it would be 
all right. If her testimony was true, there was no consent. 
At the trial, before another judge than the one who had ruled 
on the motion to suppress, the sheriff testified tbat he had 
asked for and reeeived permission from Mrs. Oarter to remove 
the truck. If his testimony was true, there was enough evi-
dence to support a finding of consent. The record indicates, 
however, that in overruling defendant's motion to exclude the 
evidence, the trial court did not consider Mrs. Carter's testi-
mony in support of the earlier motion, which flatly contra-
dicted the sheriff's testimony. It failed to do so apparently 
on the ground that it was unnecessary to reconsider a matter 
already considered by another judge. It indicated that de-
fendant would not be permitted to introduce evidence consid-
ered on the earlier motion. On retrial it will be possible for 
the court, if evidence obtained from the truck is introduced 
again, to consider all the evidence bearing on the question of 
Mrs. Oarter's consent to the search of the truck and determine 
whether she or the sheriff is to be believed. 
Defendant next contends that the prosecution deliberately 
destroyed material physical evidence, implying that as a con-
sequence defendant cannot ever be given a fair trial. In his 
affidavit defense counsel alleges that he requested the district 
attorney to allow defendant's criminologist to inspect the Log 
Cabin; that the district attorney informed counsel that the 
keys to the premises had been returned to the attorney for 
Carey's executrix; that counsel discovered that the keys had 
not in fact been returned to the attorney but must have still 
heen in the possession of the prosecution. On January 6th. 
defense counsel again asked the district attorney to permit 
defendant's criminologist to inspect the premises. The dis-
trict attorney replied tlwt an inspection would be permitted 
on January 14th, but on January 13th he informed defem;e 
eounsel that the premises had been cleaned up and returned 
to the Oarey family. 
If these allegations be true, the State may have disabled 
itself from ever giving defendant a fair trial. Following the 
incidents in January, however, defendant did not make any 
such sweeping' (·laim ofprejudiee. [6] Instead. he m-oved the 
court to compel the uistrict attorney to turn over to defend-
) 
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ant's criminologist all physical evidence taken from the Log 
Cabin, all photographs made there, and the findings of the 
prosecution's criminologist based on his examination of the 
premises. Defendant stated that unless his motion were 
granted there could not be a fair trial. In fact no order 
of court was necessary, for the district attorney voluntarily 
produced all that defendant requested. Defendant's apparent 
satisfaction was a concession that access to all that the prose-
cution had discovered was an adequate substitute for inspec-
tion of the premises by his own criminologist. Moreover, de-
fendant does not contend that specific evidence was suppressed, 
or that there is any likelihood that his criminologist would 
have found evidence not unearthed by the prosecution's expert. 
[7] Defendant next cites as error the exclusion of certain 
evidence. The prosecution relied on defendant's attempted 
suicide as evidence of a guilty mind, and thus as indirect 
evidence that defendant had administered the beating to 
Carey. To rebut this inference defendant sought to introduce 
testimony by Dr. Locarnini that immediately after defendant 
attempted suicide he was rushed to the hospital in a critical 
condition; that the doctor thought he would die; that when 
asked if he thought he would die defendant answered yes; 
that he answered yes when arsked if he wanted to clear his 
conscience and then stated that he had passed some bad 
checks but made no mention of the Log Cabin or Carey. 
It was error to exclude this testimony, for it provided an 
explanation for defendant's attempted suicide other than that 
offered by the prosecution. (See People v. Goodwin, 202 Cal. 
527,540-541 [261 P. 1009] ; People v. Sainz, 162 Cal. 242, 246 
[121 P. 922] ; Peop7e v. Anderson, 57 Cal.App. 721,727 [208 
P. 204J ; 22 C.J.S. 965.) The testimony would not be merely 
cumulative. True, defendant's testimony on the stand and 
his statement to the district attorney, recorded and played 
in court, apprised the jury of the reasons defendant gave 
for his attempted suicide, and these were the same as he gave 
when he was at the point of death. It does not follow, how-
ever, that Dr. Locarnini's testimony would be merely cumula-
tive. Although cumulatiye in the sense that it was identieal 
in subject matter with this other evidence. the testimony 
was not cumulative in respect to its evidentiary weight. The 
jury would be more 1Ill'lined to believe an explanation given 
immediately after the attempted suieide, when dE'fendant 
thought he was going to· aie. than the same ('x planation given 
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for fabrication intervened. Defendant's suicide note to his 
uncle before the attack on Carey was some evidence of motiva-
tion for his attempted suicide other than guilty knowledge of 
the attack. Since the note was written before the attack, 
however, it could not be so persuasive evidence as the state-
ment to Dr. Locarnini. The note made no mention of the 
bad checks or any other particular reason for suicide. The 
reason for the exclusion of merely cumulative evidence, that 
its slight probative value is 9utweighed by the disadvantage 
of confusing the jury and obscuring the fundamental issues 
(see 6 Wigmore, Evidence 576-578, 581-586 (3d ed. 1940», 
fails in the present case because the probative value of the 
excluded testimony was greater than that of the other evi-
dence introduced on the same issue. 
[8] The court also erred in excluding the testimony of de-
fendant's minister. Defendant offered the testimony of Rev-
erend Crouch that on October 4th defendant told him the 
same story as he told on the stand: that he had left the Log 
Cabin, and then returned and found Carey lying on the floor 
of the card room, and in turning him over got blood on his 
clothes. At the time he told this story to Reverend Crouch, 
defendant did not know that the blood on his clothes had 
been analyzed as Carey's type or that hairs similar to Carey's 
had been found on his trousers. Defendant had a right to 
introduce this testimony to rebut the prosecution's charge 
that his story was a recent fabrication. (See People v. Har-
denbrook, ante, pp. 345, 351-352 [309 P.2d 424]; People 
v. Walsh, 47 Cal.2d 36, 48 [301 P.2d 247] ; People v. Kynette, 
15 Ca1.2d 731, 753-754 [104 P.2d 794], cert. denied, 312 U.S. 
703 [61 8. Ct. 806, 85 L.Ed. 1136].) Again, this evidence 
would not be merely cumulative. In the tape-recorded inter-
view between defendant and the district attorney, introduced 
in evidence, defendant did not give the explanation he gave 
on the stand, but on the contrary disclaimed any knowledge 
of the attack on Carey. This statement did not, therefore, 
rebut the charge of recent fabrication but gave it additional 
support. The statement to Reverend Crouch was the only 
declaration by defendant that tended to rebut that charge and 
should have been admitted. 
Defendant next cites as error the admission of certain evi-
dence. Dr. Kirk was permitted to testify that he had made 
certain experiments. in blood dynamics: that he had beaten 
various bloody objects with instruments of different shapes in 
order to grasp the relationship between blood spots and their 
) 
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canses. Defendant contends that it was error to admit this 
evidence because the experiments were not conducted under 
circumstances substantially similar to those in the card room 
of the Log Cabin when Carey was beaten. [9] It is true that 
the conditions were not substantially similar, but generally this 
requirement is imposed only when it is claimed that the results 
of an experiment are directly relevant to some issue in the 
case. (People v. Wagner, 29 Cal.App. 363, 367-370 [155 P. 
649].) The prosecution made no attempt to show that because 
certain spots were produced by a certain cause in the experi-
ments, similar spots on defendant's clothes or the floor of the 
card room must have been produced by a similar cause. In 
fact, there was no evidence of the results of the experiments; 
Dr. Kirk testified only that he had made them. 
[10] Evidence that he had made the experiments was intro-
duced to qualify him as an expert in blood dynamics, to show 
that by training and experience he was able from an analysis of 
the size and shape of blood spots to determine their source 
with some degree of accuracy, and to enable the jury to test 
the reliability of his opinions by revealing their foundation. 
For these purposes the evidence was properly admitted. 
(People v. Crooms, 66 Cal.App.2d 491, 496 [152 P.2d 533] ; 
Hastings v. Serleto, 61 Cal.App.2d 672, 688-689 [143 P.2d 
956].) It may be that when a specific experiment is the sole 
basis for an expert opinion, it would be essential to an ade-
quate foundation that the experiment be made under condi-
tions substantially similar to those that existed under the 
facts of the case, as it is essential to relevancy when the 
results of an experiment are introduced as direct evidence on 
an issue. The experiments in the present case, however, were 
by no means the sole basis for Dr. Kirk's opinion. He testi-
fied to general experience and knowledge of chemistry and 
physics, and of blood dynamics in particular. The experi-
ments themselves were the last phase of work extending over 
a number of years, and Dr. Kirk stated that his opinions did 
not rest solely on their results. 
From an analysis of the size and shape of blood spots in 
the card room, Dr. Kirk gave his opinion as to what their 
point of origin must have been. Then, from an analysis 
of the blood spots on defendant's clothes, he stated that if 
the blood was spattered on the clothes at the time Carey was 
beaten, the person wearing them must have been not more than 
two and one-half feet from the source of the blood. These 
inferences required knowledge and experience beyond those 
- . 
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of ordinary jurors and could assist them to weigh the evi-
dence more perceptively than they could unaided. (People v. 
Crooms, 66 Ca1.App.2d 491, 494-496 [152 P.2d 533]; see 
People v. Cole, 47 Cal.2d 99, 103-106 [301 P.2d 854] ; George 
v. Bekim Van «; Storage Co., 33 Cal.2d 834, 843-844 [205 
P.2d 1037].) 
[l1J Defendant contends that the court abused its discre-
tion in admitting into evidence certain colored slides of Carey 
taken at the time of the autopsy. The slides showed the de-
ceased's head, face, and neck,and the wounds that had caused 
his death, and were used by the autopsy surgeon as the basis 
for his testimony. If the principal effect of demonstrative 
evidence such as photographs is to arouse the passions of the 
jury and inflame them against the defendant because of the 
horror of the crime, the evidence must of course be excluded. 
(People v. Oheary, ante, pp. 301, 311-312 [309 P.2d 431] I 
People v. Oavanaugh, 44 Cal.2d 252, 266-268 [282 P.2d 
53], cert. denied, 350 U.S. 950 [76 8.Ct. 325, 100 L.Ed. 828].) 
On the other hand, if the evidence has probative value with 
respect to a fact in issue that outweighs the danger of preju-
dice to the defendant, the evidence is admissible even if it is 
gruesome and may incidentally arouse the passions of the jury. 
(People v. Oheary, ante, pp. 301, 312 [309 P.2d 431].) It 
is primarily for the trial court in the exercise of its discretion 
to weigh the importance of putting before the jury all that 
may reasonably assist them in the determination of guilt 
against the danger that they will substitute emotion for reason 
as the basis of their verdict. 
[12J In the present case one of the crucial qUE'stions was 
whether Carey's wounds were caused by the flex-handle wrench 
found in Edgar Slough, and the colored slides graphically 
showed the nature of these wounds. The autopsy surgeon used 
the slides to point out that the wounds must have been inflicted 
by an instrument that was hard, had smooth edges, and was 
at least six inches in length, and -that the wounds could have 
been caused by the wrench. He pointed also to certain irregu-
larities in the wounds, stating that they could correspond to an 
irregularity in the wrench, and that these irregularities were 
probably more accurately depicted in the slides than in his 
blackboard diagrams. In these circumstances the court did 
not abuse its discretion in admitting the slides in evidence, 
particularly since'it carefully warned the jury against. allow-
ing the slides to prejudice them against defendant. 
[13] The court did commit error, however, in not excluding 
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a statement by one Bennett, a man who had also been in the 
Log Cabin and was an important suspect in the case, that 
he had been willing to take a lie detector test. The court 
ordered stricken his further testimony that, "and some other 
people wouldn't take [such a test) •.• ," but in view of the 
testimony the court permitted to stand, the implication sur-
vived that defendant had refused to take a lie detector test and 
that his refusal furnished some evidence of guilty knowledge. 
Lie detector tests do not as yet have enough reliability to 
justify the admission of expert testimony based on their 
results. (People v. W ochnick, 98 Cal.App.2d 124, 126-128 
[219 P.2d 70); People v. Porter, 99 Cal.App.2d 506, 510-
511 [222 P.2d 151).) It therefore follows that a suspect's 
willingness or unWillingness to take such a test is likewise 
without enough probative value to justify its admission. The 
suspect may refuse to take the test, not because he fears that 
it will reveal consciousness of guilt, but because it may record 
as a lie what is in fact the truth. A guilty suspect, on the 
other hand, may be willing to hazard the test in the hope that 
it will erroneously record innocence, knowing that even if it 
does not the results cannot be used as evidence against him. 
Defendant next contends that it was error to deny 
him the right to inspect a document used in thecross-exami-
nation of his wife. :Mrs. Carter stated on cross-examination 
that she could not remember if defendant was wearing a red 
cap when he left the house on the morning of September 29th. 
The prosecutor then asked her if she remembered being inter-
viewed by the sheriff on September 30th when a stenographer 
was present, and read from the stenographer's transcript 
questions put to :Mrs. Carter, and her answer that she believed 
defendant had been wearing a cap. Defense counsel requested 
and was denied the right to inspect the transcript. 
[14] We have recently held that the defendant in a crimi-
nal case can compel production when it becomes clear during 
the course of a trial that the prosecution has in its possession 
relevant and material evidence that is not confidential, be-
cause "the state has no interest in denying the accused access 
to all evidence that can throw light on issues in the rase .... " 
(People v. Riser, 47 Ca1.2d 566, 586 [305 P.2d 1].) [15] We 
were there concerned with the defendant's right to inspect 
statements that he reasonably believed could be used to im-
peach the prosecution '.8 witnesses, but the reasons for the deci-
sion apply with equal force to a statement the prosecution has 
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fend ant now seeks to inspect for the purpose of rehabilitation. 
The prosecutor may read to the jury extracts from the tran-
script selected with an eye to putting the witness in the 
worst possible light by emphasizing the gap between his prior 
statement and his present testimony. It is clearly unfair to 
deny the defendant an opportunity to show that the extracts 
have been taken out of context, and that when read with 
other parts of the statement the alleged inconsistency dis-
appears. To be effective such an opportunity must include 
the right to see the transcript the prosecution has used; the 
witness' memory of what he said is not enough. (See People 
v. Stevenson, 103 Cal.App. 82, 88-92 [284 P. 487] ; Meadors v. 
Oommonwealth, 281 Ky. 622 [136 S.W.2d 1066, 1068-1069] ; 
6 Wigmore, Evidence 477 (3d ed. 1940).) 
On rebuttal the prosecution was allowed to introduce in 
evidence the red cap found in Edgar Slough. Defendant. con-
tends that by withholding this important evidence instead of 
presenting it as part of its case in chief, the prosecution 
gained an unfair advantage over defendant. The prosecution 
contends in reply that since defendant denied on the stand 
that he had been to Edgar Slough or left the wallet or wrt'llch 
there, the cap was properly admitted to rebut this testimony 
or impeach defendant's credibility. 
[16] Section 1093, subdivision 4, of the Penal Code pro-
vides that after the defendant has offered his evidence, the 
prosecution may then offer "rebutting testimony only, unless 
the court, for good reason, in furtherance of justice ... " per-
mits it to offer evidence upon its original case. In a sense 
all evidence that tends to establish the defendant's guilt over 
his protestations of innocence rebuts the defendant's case, but 
it is not all rebuttal evidence within the purpose of section 
1093, subdivision 4. The purpose of the restriction in that 
section is to assure an orderly presentation of evidence so that 
the trier of fact will not be confused; to prevent a party 
from unduly magnifying certain evidence by dramatically in-
troducing it late in the trial; and to avoid any unfair surprise 
that may result when a party who thinks he has met his 
opponent's case is suddenly confronted at the end of trial 
with an additional piece of crucial eyidence. [17] Thus 
proper rebuttal evidcnce does not include a material part of the 
case in the prosecution's possession that tends to establish the 
defendant's commission of the crime. It is restricted to evi-
dence made nec~ssary by the defendant's case in the senst' 
that he has introduced new evidence or made assertions that 
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were not implicit in his denial of guilt. (See Peop7c v. Bllril. 
42 Ca1.2d 200, 211-212 [266 P.2d 505], cert. denied, 348 U.s. 
848 [75 S.Ct. 73, 99 L.Ed. 668] ; People v. Nyc, 38 Ca1.2d 34. 
38-39 [237 P.2d 1] ; People v. Avery, 35 Ca1.2d 487, 491 [2]8 
P.2d 527] ; 6 Wigmore, Evidence 510-511,516 (3d ed. 1940).) 
[18] A defendant's reiterated denial of guilt and the princi-
pal facts that purportedly establish it docs not justify the pros-
ecution's introduction of new evidence to establish that which 
defendant would clearly have denied from the start. 
[19] The red cap found in Edgar Slough was crucial 
evidence tending to show that defendant had put the wallet 
and wrench in the slough and therefore had beaten and 
robbed Carey. Defendant's plea made it clear that he would 
not admit having gone to the slough, and his denial on the 
stand furnished no new matter for rebuttal. The evidence 
should have been put in as part of the case in chief. (See 
People v. Rodriguez, 58 Cal.App.2d 415, 418-419 [136 P.2d 
626].) 
[20] Changes in the order of proof called for by section 
1093 can be made within the sound discretion of the trial 
court. (Ct. People v. Avery, 35 Ca1.2d 487, 491 [218 P.2d 
527].) In the present case, however, the prosecution offers 
no reason why the cap could not have been introduced in 
chief, but since defendant did not make completely clear to 
the trial court the objection that he now argues, we would not 
be justified in finding that there has been an abuse of dis-
cretion. On the retrial of this case an order of proof will no 
doubt be observed that is consonant with the purposes of 
section 1093. 
[21] Defendant next contends that the court abused its 
discretion in denying his motion to reopen the case to intro-
duce evidence that on the 11th of October a red cap, similar 
to the one found in Edgar Slough and to the one owned by 
defendant, had been found on the corner of Fifth Street and 
Esplanade in Chico on the route defendant had taken from 
the Log Cabin to his house. 
The record is not altogether clear whether this was a motion 
to reopen or a motion for a continuance. During the extended 
discussion in chambers there were several references to a 
possible continuance, but defendant's counsel early stated, 
"Now I would have to request that I be permitted to reopen 
to explore on surrebuttal the finding of this hat," and in 
formally denying defendant's motion the court stated, "Under 
the circumstanceS, I am denying the motion to reopen at this 
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time. " It does not appear that for defendant's purposes a 
continuance was essential. The important thing was to put 
before the jury the fact that a second red cap, similar to 
the one worn by defendant, had been found on the corner of 
Fifth and Esplanade on October 11th. The district attorney 
himself suggested that a stipulation of these facts could per-
haps be worked out, and indeed they were not in dispute. 
Even had a short continuance proved necessary to enable 
defendant to put the facts before the jury, it should have 
been granted. 
The finding of the second cap was highly relevant; it might 
even have become a decisive consideration in defendant's 
favor. The trial court itself declared, upon the district attor-
ney's argument that the finding of the second cap was irrele-
vant, "But one of the key circumstances in your case is a 
red hat." The prosecution relied heavily on the fact that a 
red cap similar to the one worn by defendant had been found 
with the wrench and Carey's wallet in Edgar Slough in No-
vember. Had the jury known of the finding of the second 
red cap, the probative value of the first might have been 
sharply reduced. 
During the discussion in chambers the sheriff pro-
duced a red cap found in the evidence room of his office. The 
fact that this cap could not at that moment be conclusively 
identified as the cap found on the corner of Fifth and Espla-
nade was no reason to deny defendant's motion. Defendant 
had only to show that a red cap had been found, not to 
produce any particular red cap. Moreover, any confusion 
as to the identity of the cap was attributable to the sheriff's 
office, not to defendant. After the red cap was found at 
Fifth and Esplanade, it was sent to Dr. Kirk to be tested for 
blood stains. He found none. The cap was then returned to 
Deputy Longacre in the sheriff's office who presumably put 
it in the evidence room. Soon after he retired from police 
work. A few weeks before trial the cap could not be found, 
but after a search of the evidence room a red cap was found; 
it was this cap that the sheriff produced in chambers. The 
district attorney suggested that it could be the one found at 
Fifth and Esplanade, or that it could be another. The sheriff 
could not recall that any third red cap had come into his 
office. There was nothing to indicate that the cap produced 
was not the original red cap. 
The court was, hot justified in denying defendant .. 
motion on the ground that his counsel knew about the &eCODd 
) 
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red cap before trial but took no steps to obtain it. Tbe extent 
of counsel's knowledge appears from the following extracts 
from the record: 
"MR. STONE: But I must state to the Court that only this 
morning did I discover-was I informed for the first time 
that the sheriff's office of Butte County, between September 
29 and the date of this trial-and I don't know the date-
found or had turned in to them in Chico a red baseball cap, 
one that is not in evidence, and that there has been no 
showing-there bas been no reason for it whatsoever. It was 
found, as I understand it, at 5th and tIle Esplanade, which 
is between the Log Cabin and the defendant's residence on 
the route which the defendant himsrlf says he took. I am 
also informed that it is of the same type and description as 
the one presently in evidence. In other words, it is red, it is 
a baseball cap, and also that it is greasy" 
And later in the discussion--
"MR. STONE: Sometime back Mr. Carter in my discussion 
with him stated to me that he had been questioned about a hat, 
that there was no statement by Mr. Carter to me as to where 
the hat was found, when it was found. He told me that be had 
not been shown the hat. I had no way of knowing in view 
of tbe fact tbat be bad told me there was no bat shown to 
him as to whether or not this was simply an effort--. 
"THE COURT: Was 5th and Esplanade mentioned? 
"MR. STONE: Not to my recollection, no, Your Honor. 
"MR. LYDE: I wonder if tbe Court would ask whetber or 
not he mentioned a street. 
"MR. STONE: I believe, as I recall, wbat Mr. Carter told 
me, he said it was found uptown. 
"MR. LYDE: Well, there, you see. We never told him we 
found the one in the slough. At least I don't believe I did. 
Bruce may bave. Go ahead, Mr. Stone. 
"MR. STONE: But I would want to simply point out to the 
Court that when Mr. Carter told me that he had not been 
shown the hat that I thought this perhaps was simply an effort 
in view of the statements made by Cox, which appeareci in 
the newspaper, a statement by Beer-and I had talked to Beer 
and Cox-and he had a bat on-I thougbt perhaps tbis was 
an attempt to simply by tbe prosecution to endeavor to get a 
confession out of the defendant and I put no weight on tbis 
tbing at all. Now, you also recall, Your Honor, tbat-. 
Well, I won't go any furtber. I have answered as best I can." 
In some circumstances it migbt be proper to find that such 
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information imposes on counsel the burden of pursuing every 
evidentiary possibility on pain of being denied the right to 
reopen for later discovered evidence. In the present case, 
however, because of the closeness of the proof, the vital char-
acter of tbe evidence defendant sought to introduce, the 
seriousness of tbe charge, and the absence of any substantial 
considerations weighing against reopening the case, it was 
clearly improper. . 
Neither defendant nor his counsel knew that a red cap 
similar to defendant's had been found on the corner of Fifth 
and Esplanade. The prosecution did not so advise them. 
They bad only fragmentary information that some cap had 
been mentioned by the police. Tbey would understandably 
not appreciate tbe significance of this information if, as 
seems likely, it came at a time antedating the discovery of 
the red cap in the slough, when it had not yet become impor-
tant for defendant to prove that thl' red cap in ihe slough 
was not his cap. 
Moreover, there were no substantial reasons against reopen-
ing the case. Defendant had only just rested, argument had 
not begun and the jury had not been instructed, and it does 
not appear that granting defendant's request would have en-
tailed any great incom-enience. In a trial that had already 
consumed 13 days, it was not unreasonable to request an 
extension of a few hours to put before the jury evidence that 
in justice should have been considered, as the trial court 
itself must have recognized when it said in reference to 
informing the jury of the finding of the second cap, "I don't 
think I could deprive him [defendant] of that opportunity 
and still give him a fair trial." Tbis decisive consideration 
should have overcome arguments based on the notion that a 
criminal trial is a rigorously adversary proceeding in which a 
party must seize his opportunities when presented or forever 
lose them. 
People v. Buckowski, 37 Ca1.2d 629 [233 P.2d 912], and 
People v. Fountain;170 Cal. 460 [150 P. 341], do not support 
the trial court's ruling in the present ease. The defendants 
in those eases had in their possession long before trial as 
much information as the prosecution, and all that was neces-
sary to enable them to obtain the evidence they wished. In 
each case the defendant sought to postpone indefinitely the 
beginning of t:rial rather than to reopen to admit specific 
evidence already at hand. The materiality of the evidence 
that each claimed could be found during a continuance was 
) 
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remote and speculative, whereas the evidence defendant sought 
to introduce in the present case was relevant and material. 
Finally, in the Buckowski ease, where the question was 
whether the defendant had committed the homicide, the evi-
dence against him was overwhelming, whereas in the present 
case the evidence was such that additional evidence might well 
have affected the result. 
[22] Defendant's final objections go to the court's failure 
to give certain instructions. Defendant contends that the 
court should have instructed on the distinction between rob-
bery and burglary, because the jury knew that defendant had 
been convicted of burglary in another state and might have 
thought that burglary like robbery involved violence against 
the person of another. This argument implies that knowl-
edge of defendant's conviction could directly affect the jury's 
determination of guilt. The court carefully instructed the 
jury, however, that it could take defendant's prior conviction 
into account only in assessing his credibility, and there is 
no reason to think that it did not obey this instruction. On 
the issue of credibility, it was irrelevant whether or not de- I 
fendant's prior conviction had been for a crime of violence. 
[23] Nor was there error in the court's failure to instruct 
that the homicide was not in the perpetration of a robbery if 
the intent to rob arose after the attack on the deceased. 
At no time during the trial did defendant rely on the theory 
that such an instruction would have embodied. He did not 
contend that he thought of robbing Carey only after attacking 
him; on the contrary he denied either attacking or robbing 
him. In each case that he invokes, People v. Hudson, 45 Cal. 
2d 121, 124-126 [287 P.2d 497], and People v. Carnine, 41 Cal. 
2d 384, 387-392 [260 P.2d 16], the defendant admitted killing 
and robbing the victim and relied only on the defense that 
the intent to rob had not been formed until after the homicide. 
The court in the present case was not required to give an 
instruction that would have had no foundation in the evidence 
or in any theory on which the case was tried. (See People v. 
Eggers, 30 CfA.2d 676, 687 [185 P.2d 1], cert. denied, 333 
U.S. 858 [68 8.Ct. 728, 92 L.Ed. 1138].) 
[24] The court refused to give an instruction that in a case 
resting wholly on circumstantial evidence, "each fact which is 
essential to complete a ellain of circumstances that will estab-
lish the defendant's guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt. " More, it positively informed the jury that thl' law 
. was otherwise. In People v. Watson, 46 Ca1.2d 818, 830-831 
) 
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[299 P.2d 243], we held that the refusal to give such an in-
struc1ion was error. A fortiori there was error here. 
Defendant contends that still other errors were committed 
by the court and that there was misconduct on the part of the 
district attorney. Since the acts complained of are not likely 
to attend a new trial, it is not necessary to consider them 
here. On the basis of the errors eonsidered earlier it is clear 
that defendant has not had a fair trial. The closeness of 
the proof indicates that absent these errors the jury might 
have reached a different verdict. 
The judgment and order are reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I concur in the judgment or reversal and 
generally in the reasoning set forth in the majority opinion. 
I feel, however, that error also was committed in the admission 
of Dr. Kirk's testimony concerning his experiments with the 
pattern made by blood spattering from an object made of 
wood, sponge rubber and a thin plastic sheet. The admission 
of such testimony invaded the province of the jury as it was 
based on conditions far removed from those actually existing 
at the time the crime was committed. Such testimony from a 
person as noted in criminology as Dr. Kirk could have had no 
other effect than to impress and prejudice the jury particu-
larly in a case as closely balanced as the one here under 
consideration. 
This court held in People v. W oon Tuck W 0, 120 Cal. 294. 
296-297 [52 P. 833], that unless such experiments are shown 
to have been made under essentially the same conditions that 
existed in the case on trial, the tendency is to confuse and 
mislead rather than enlighten the jury. It most certainly 
cannot be said that an object made of wood, sponge rubber 
and a plastic sheet constituted the same thing as a human 
bead. Further, as noted in tbe majority opinion, the prose-
cution made no attempt to show that because eertain spots 
were produced by a certain cause in the experiments, similar 
spots on defendant's trousers or on the floor or the card room 
must have been produced by a similar cause. "Evidence of 
tbis kind should be received with caution, and only be admitted 
when it is obvious to the court from the nature of the experi-
ments that the jury will be enlightened rather than confused. 
In many circumstances a slight change in the conditions under 
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wholly destroy its value as evidence, and make it harmful 
rather than helpfuL" (People v. Wagner, 29 Cal.App. 363, 
369-370 [155 P. 649] ; see also People v. Ely, 203 Cal. 628 
[265 P. 818] ; People v. Parker, 4 Cal.App.2d 421, 424 [40 
P.2d 836] ; McGough v. Hendrickson, 58 CatApp.2d 60 [136 
P.2d 110].) 
Defendant's story was that the spots on his clothing were 
due to blood spraying on him as he handled the deceased's 
body when he discovered it after the beating. Dr. Kirk's 
testimony was to the effect that the blood could not have gotten 
on defendant in that manner but could have gotten there only 
if he had administered the beating. It was the jury's 
prerogative to draw its own cOitclusion from the evidence with-
out expert testimony based on totally dissimilar facts. 
For this reason, as well as those stated in the majority 
opinion, I concur in the reversal of the judgment. 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
SPENCE, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I agree with 
certain portions of the opinion prepared by Mr. Justice Tray-
nor, but I disagree with other portions and dissent from the 
conclusion that the judgment and order denying a new trial 
should be reversed. . 
More specifically, I agree with those portions which declare 
certain of defendant's claims of error to be without merit. 
On the other hand, I cannot agree with certain portions of 
the discussion which sustain some of defendant's claims of 
prejudicial error. It would serY{' nO useful purpose, however, 
to enter into a discussion of each of the several claims, hut a 
reference to one such claim appears appropriate. 
One of defendant's principal claims of prejudicial error 
rests upon the failure of the trial court to give defendant's 
requested instruction to the effect that in a case resting wholly 
upon circumstantial evidence, "each fact which is essential 
to complete a chain of circumstances that will establish the 
defendant's guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 
This refusal is declared by Mr. Justice Traynor to constitute 
prejudicial error. I cannot agree. 
This court held in People v. Watso?!, 46 Ca1.2d 818, 830-
831 [299 P.2d 243], that the requested instruction was a proper 
instruction, but that in the light of the instructions given, 
there was no prejudicial error in the failure to give it. The 
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in this general field including CALJIC 21, 24, 25 and 26. 
Additionally, the trial court specifically instructed: "Before 
the jury may find a defendant guilty, the law requires that 
all of the esseI}tial elements of the crime charged, and each 
fact necessary to establish the commission of the crime by 
the defendant must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and 
to a moral certainty." The quoted instruction embodies the 
principle found in defendant's requested instruction, and the 
subject was therefore adequately covered. 
Furthermore, I find nothing in the record to justify the 
statement that the trial court "positively informed the jury 
that the law was otherwise." During a colloquy between 
court and counsel on the voir dire examination of the jurors, 
and relating to an objection to a lengthy question on another 
point, the trial court did make a statement that "Each cir-
cumstance does not require proof to a moral certainty and 
beyond a reasonable doubt." Counsel for defendant' imme-
diately said: "That wasn't my point. That was not the 
point. Perhaps I can state it in another way." The trial 
court then said: "I could not have answered the question 
yes or no without numerous other factors to be considered." 
Counsel for defendant then reframed his lengthy question, and 
the reframed question was answered without objection. 
In my opinion, the trial court's statement was correct and 
in any event, it could not have been reasonably construed as 
contrary to the trial court's formal instructions on the subject 
under discm'lsion. It has never been held that "each circum-
stance," as distinguished from "each fact which is essential 
to complete a chain of circumstances that will establish the 
defendant's guilt" (as stated in the requested instruction) or 
"each fact necessary to establish the commission of the crime 
by the defendane' (as stated in the given instruction) must 
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Certain facts or cir-
cumstances may appear in a lengthy record, which facts 
and circumstances may not be essential to the determination 
of the guilt of a dt'fendant; but it is only the" essential" or 
"necessary" facts in the chain of circumstances which must 
be proved by the quantum of proof required to sustain a 
criminal convirtion. As above indicated, the trial court did 
instruct the jury that "each fact neressary to establish the 
commission of tIle crime by the defendant must be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty." I there-
fore find no prejl1ijicial error in the failure to give the 
requested instruction. 
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It may be aRsumed that in the lengthy record covering 
more than 1,700 pages, some error may be found. A readin~ 
of that record convinces me, howe"er, that the evidence pre-
sented a chain of circumstances so tightly linked about de-
fendant that there is not the slightest doubt conceruing defend-
ant's guilt of the cold-blooded murder of his 77-year-old 
victim in the perpetration of robbery. I find no error of such 
nature as to sustain a ('laim that there was any likelihood that 
a result more favorable t.o defendant would have been reached 
in the ev~nt that such error had not occurred. Under these 
circumstances, I believe that this is a typical case for the 
application of the constitutional mandate, which provides that 
no reversal shall be ol'dered "unless, after an examination of 
the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of 
the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a 
mi!;~arriage of justice." (Const., art. VI, § 4%; People v. 
Watson, supra, 46 Ca1.2d 818, 837-838.) 
I would affirm the judgment of conviction and the order 
denying a new trial. 
Shenk, J., and McComb, J., eoncurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was t1enied July 16, 
1957. Shenk, J., Spence, .J., and McComb, J., were of the 
opinion that the petition should be granted. 
